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Offshoring, Outsourcing,
and Strategy in the Global Firm
Stephen Tallman, University of Richmond, United States

O ffshore

outsourcing of many of the activities of the firm

has become a major issue of concern in welfare economics, politics,
business management, and international business scholarship. From
both practical and scholarly perspectives, though, we must recognize
that this is not a new phenomenon, and that neither outsourcing nor
offshoring is necessarily the problem that has been represented in the
popular and scholarly press (Contractor et al., 2010; Engardio, 2006).
The production of goods in locations other than those in which they
are sold has been an established strategy of multinational firms for decades—as has the subset of situations in which offshore locations are
used to produce for home country consumption. “Traditional” situations
such as Nike moving shoe manufacturing to Asia have become commonplace and attract little attention. However, the dramatic increase of
offshore service provision since 2000 was unexpected, affects the sort
of knowledge work that was to be the refuge of the developed world,
and imposes international competition on firms, jobs, and markets that
had been seen as exempt—and has attracted new attention. In a similar vein, we are finding that offshore outsourcing is expanding rapidly
in “new era” sectors such as alternative energy. Even as the science and
engineering of alternative energy emerge from Western university labs,
companies hoping to exploit these new ideas are finding not only that
overseas manufacturing is less expensive but also that only countries
like China retain the capacity to manufacture such goods. Perhaps we
should take a longer look at offshore outsourcing to see what it can offer us both as scholars and as business practitioners—but without the
distractions of populist hysteria.
This article addresses three issues where we international business
scholars, collectively, could benefit from cooling down and considering
what we already know about international markets and multinational
firms rather than pursuing “hot” topics. First, I suggest that by focusing on the narrow issue of producing offshore for the domestic market, whether goods or services, scholars are adding to the overheated,
even jingoistic, discussion of the issue and also are losing opportunities
to gain theoretical and empirical insights. Second, the general lack of
strategic perspective on the topic has put the focus on cost-reduction
through location in emerging economies and has led to fears for undifferentiated wholesale relocation of value-production to these countries. Third, convergence on a 2x2 matrix of in-house versus outsourced
operations and of on- versus off-shore locations has led to a focus on
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corner solutions that lock discussion into black-and-white considerations of what is happening as opposed to measured concern for the
strategic whys, wheres, and hows.

The Global Firm and Intra-firm (or Intra-network)
Trade
The offshoring discussion focuses on the eventuality that a domestic
firm sends some portion of its value-adding activities, whether manufacturing, business processes, or software writing, to another country
while continuing to sell its output into the domestic market. This leaves
the domestic customer in the position of transferring money to foreign
producers rather than to locals, thus draining liquidity out of the domestic economy—or so the story goes. This picture leaves little room
for the growing phenomenon of the global firm. Rather, we should consider the overall reliance of global markets on networks of international
trade and investment. If a global firm generates value—whether in
product design, manufacturing, service support, distribution, marketing, customer service, or any other activity—in multiple differentiated
locations around the world (or even within one or more regions of that
world), uses intra-firm trade of intermediate goods and services to tie
together its operations into an efficient whole, and then sells unique
mixes of goods and services in multiple differentiated markets around
the world (or region), just what makes the provision of some of these
products to the original home market unique?
The reality of international trade and investment is that most flows of
capital and goods and services are managed by multinational firms.
Indeed, the levels of intra-industry and intra-firm trade and of foreign
direct investment traditionally have been used to characterize the global scope of industries and firms (Kobrin, 1991). What is clear in today’s
marketplace is that better communication technology and increasingly
sophisticated views of value-adding activities are allowing global firms
to disaggregate or finely slice their activities and to more easily source
intermediate goods from the most efficient location—much as Bruce
Kogut prescribed in 1985 (Kogut, 1985). Indeed, using comparative
advantage, or location-tied superior productivity, as a key basis for competitive advantage, or firm-specific production efficiency, is the great
strength of the multinational firm.
continued on page 4
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continued from page 3
Prahalad and Doz’s (1987) early characterization of the globally efficient
multinational assumes centralized production facilities, but not necessarily home-country production. Bartlett and Ghoshal’s discussion of
differentiated subsidiary roles in the transnational firm (1989) clearly
supposes that subsidiaries in some markets will create significant value
that will be incorporated in products sold in others—or at home. Separating value generation from value consumption is a part of the issue,
as is the idea of firms sourcing value from multiple locations, as is the
reality of many ways of coordinating internationally dispersed, disaggregated value-adding activities. However, such production was never
assumed to be only for the home market; rather it is production for a global or
regional market. In the case, for instance,
of US multinational firms setting up production facilities in a few Western European sites to serve the entire Western
European market, the home country is
on neither end of the production-consumption equation. Likewise, business services moved abroad as part
of the overhead activities of local and regional headquarters, which
would be expected to locate service and support activities at their locations.

“

There is no inherent reason in today’s world to assume that
strategic leadership comes from the home country . . .

Despite all the discussion, offshoring seems to be explained largely by
comparative advantage, albeit a sophisticated version in which differentiated inputs are clearly recognized, and communication and governance technologies through which geographically distant operations
can be integrated. However, consideration of the developing model of
the global firm as a differentiated network of distinct subsidiaries, affiliates, alliances, and contracts all tied together by a small headquarters
focused on communication and coordination rather than command
and control offers a variety of new directions in organizational economics and management theory. The responses of global firms to the
demands of international markets and international sources of products in an increasingly complex global setting offer arrays of strategies
and organizations that are changing concepts of management and of
organizational and management theory.

Strategic Purpose and Core Competency
The two-dimensional characterization of offshoring and outsourcing
focuses on location and transaction governance, but ignores issues of
strategic purposes and capabilities—the discussion is one of outcomes,
not of inputs or drivers. Firms are likely to have strong capabilities and
stocks of resources in those parts of the value-adding chain that are at
their strategic core. In other value-adding steps, any individual firm may
have fewer resources or less effective capabilities, and strategic management scholars are largely united in proposing that such activities
should be located in other, more competent, firms. The idea that a complete value-adding chain, from idea to final sale, should be internalized
within a single economic entity is essentially obsolete—yet discussions
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of outsourcing seem to treat this as the preferred norm. I find that in
overlaying a strategic perspective on the location x governance matrix,
an obvious outcome is that core strategies and resources are likely to
be kept internal to the firm, while market means, based on price and
supplier reliability, are ideal for delivering generic inputs. However, a
large proportion of the assets and capabilities deployed by any firm fall
between these extremes—they are complementary or co-specialized
assets. That is, they will be essential to the firm’s ability to actually generate economic rents from its truly unique firm-specific assets, even if the
firm does not expect to gain advantage based on these assets themselves. Improvements in IT and contracting and the rise of reliable part-

”

ner firms from low-cost locations together have made access to such
assets through networks of alliances much more likely than in the past.
Strategy is also relevant to the location issue. Comparative advantage
is alive and well—not just as a cost minimization consideration, but
as a net value-producing process. From a strategic perspective, a core
activity may well be kept close to the core location, but twenty years of
discussion of transnational strategies suggests that the core for any particular business may not be in the home country—the strategic leader
subsidiary is a fact as well as an ideal. There is no inherent reason in
today’s world to assume that strategic leadership comes from the home
country or that the home market is the dominant focus of the firm.
Global firms such as Hewlett Packard or DuPont or General Electric do
not necessarily headquarter every business in the same country, state,
city, or building as the corporate headquarters, and have not done so
for some time. A production site with a set of country-specific advantages that offer unique value in combination with the firm-specific resources and capabilities of a particular multinational company could
well become a regional or global center for value-added production
(Birkinshaw, 2001; Rugman, 1981). Such a site may certainly supply the
home market, but perhaps only as a small part of its overall mission.

Here, There, or Everywhere? A Matter of Distance
My third concern is that even though the focus of the offshoring/outsourcing discussion has been on location factors and transactional
governance, analysis of these structural issues is underdeveloped.
The presentation of the business process offshoring/outsourcing decision has devolved into a 2x2 matrix, contrasting in/outsourcing with
on/offshoring (see Fig. 1). This is certainly a major improvement on the
five-year-ago discussion that commonly confused where an activity
was happening with who was doing it, but it reflects a disregard for
extensive and carefully developed bodies of work on locations and

Vol. 11, No. 1

䘀椀最⸀ 㨀 吀栀攀 伀昀昀猀栀漀爀椀渀最⼀ 伀甀琀猀漀甀爀挀椀渀最 䴀愀琀爀椀砀 漀爀 ᰠ 䴀愀欀攀⼀䈀甀礀 ጠ 䠀攀爀攀⼀吀栀攀爀攀ᴠ

Figure 1: The Offshoring/Outsourcing Matrix or “Make/Buy–Here/There”

䠀椀最栀㨀
䴀䄀䬀䔀

䐀漀洀攀猀琀椀挀
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伀昀昀猀栀漀爀攀

䐀漀洀攀猀琀椀挀
伀甀琀猀漀甀爀挀攀

伀昀昀猀栀漀爀攀
伀甀琀猀漀甀爀挀攀

䤀渀琀攀爀渀愀氀椀稀愀琀椀漀渀
䄀搀瘀愀渀琀愀最攀
䰀漀眀㨀
䈀唀夀

䰀漀眀㨀 伀一匀䠀伀刀䔀

䠀椀㨀 伀䘀䘀匀䠀伀刀䔀

䘀漀爀攀椀最渀 䰀漀挀愀琀椀漀渀 匀瀀攀挀椀昀椀挀
䄀搀瘀愀渀琀愀最攀
internalization. Looking first at the location question, we should see
that this simple approach tends to exaggerate both the risks and
the benefits of offshoring. A first consideration is that “offshore” as a
generic indicator of any and all non-home country locations commoditizes foreign locations—if you are not at home, you are simply offshore. Therefore, if “home” is high on familiarity and low on risk, “away”
tends to become the opposite—even if this is not the intent of the
original modeler. The “near-shore” construct suggests that this outcome
is becoming recognized, but really reduces the issue to geographical
distance—suggesting for instance that Canada and Mexico represent
similar distances from “home” for a US-based firm. Do we believe this?
As every basic international business textbook is at pains to discuss,
the economic, cultural, and institutional contexts of international business vary from country to country in varied and complex fashion. At a
minimum, this dichotomy should be replaced by a multi-faceted “International Distance” dimension, whether the CAGE model proposed by
Ghemawat (2007) or some other version.
At the same time, the benefits of foreign location tend to be exaggerated, so (and again from the US position that is so often assumed)
that cost differences, as the most apparent expression of comparative
advantage, become the primary, even only, benefit to be set against
the uncertainties of the foreign. However, as a variety of scholars have
begun to emphasize (Doh et al., 2009), while costs do matter in offshoring, they are never the entire story. So, while place matters, whether
seeking an offshore value production platform or foreign market entry,
it must be recognized and incorporated into models as a complex and
multifarious construct of location specific characteristics and degrees
of distance from both home country and market, not a simple ”here vs.
there” comparison!

Make-Buy or Make-Ally-Buy?
The other side of the location x governance matrix relates to who owns
and controls the activity in question. This is typically represented as a
“make-buy” decision in which the value-adding activity is either internalized, whether at home or abroad, or outsourced to a supplier in a
market transaction. This dichotomy is reminiscent of the early markethierarchy choice presented in transaction cost economics (Williamson,
1985), though the outsourcing model assumes that an activity is initially
pursued inside the company and is moved into the market only when
it is less expensive or can be done better by an outsourcing specialist—how it came to be inside the firm is not at issue. The make-buy
comparison suggests that outsourcing is done in a market transaction.
As such, the transactional costs of markets, particularly from investing
in transaction-specific assets, described by Williamson and others, make
the outsourcing choice seem particularly high risk. Presuming that the
decision has been made to outsource, the focal firm then should minimize its risks by avoiding transaction-specific investments—but this is
likely to make the outsourcing transaction inefficient and may risk a
poor fit between supplier and client, trading one cost for another.
A generation of work on alliances suggests that the “make-buy” decision
is in reality a “make-rent-buy” question, in which access to the services
of certain competences can be managed through a wide array of cooperative governance choices. Indeed, in most non-internalized offshoring transactions, the client and the provider engage in a time-extensive,
semi-customized, more-or-less flexible relationship that evolves over
time—or what is commonly called an alliance, whether an extended
contract or an equity joint venture. From a resource-based perspective
(Madhok & Tallman, 1998), alliances permit firms to focus on applying
their most specialized resources and capabilities, those that offer the
greatest potential for generating economic rents, while outsourcing
other critical activities to alliance or joint venture partners that specialcontinued on page 6
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Fig. 2: An Alternative Model of Offshoring and Outsourcing
Figure 2: An Alternative Model of Offshoring and Outsourcing
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ize in those areas (see Fig. 2). By investing in transaction and partner
specific resources, both sides can consistently improve the efficiency of
their complementary sets of assets while making abandonment of the
relationship consistently more costly and thereby providing protection
from opportunism. How often do real companies actually buy critical
services, say payroll administration, in a one-time, arms-length transaction based on price/performance that is re-bid on a frequent basis?
Recognition that outsourcing is primarily carried out through alliance
transactions changes the risk-return relationships that are expressed in
the stark make-buy choice. It also opens up the scholarship relating to
outsourcing to influence from the extensive literature on cooperative
strategies, particularly international alliances and joint ventures, which
addresses in considerable detail most of the governance concerns
expressed about outsourcing.

things! If scholars are going to add to the conversation, to provide
value to practice, they must do so by connecting current phenomena
to much-better-understood historic happenings and concepts. If we
can apply what we know about multinational firms and their capabilities and strategies as they interact with the vagaries and challenges of
the global economy, we should be able to offer recommendations for
action and predictions of performance to practitioners. If we continue
to look at offshoring and outsourcing as unique, isolated, modern phenomena, we will end up as catalogers and scolds, but with little to offer
either to practice or, in the end, to scholarship.

Offshoring/Outsourcing Is Not New

Birkinshaw, J. 2001. Strategy and management in MNE subsidiaries. In A.
M. Rugman & T. L. Brewer (Eds), The Oxford handbook of international business: 380–401. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The effort to treat offshoring/outsourcing as a new or unique strategic
action has resulted in its apparent lack of success in developing theory
or advancing the study of either internationalization or strategic management beyond observation and simple empirical studies. This same
attitude toward the phenomenon limits the potential for scholarship
to say much of value to managers—who are already deeply engaged
in international sourcing and quickly learning when, where, and how
to pursue it in practice. Right now, the literature tells managers who
are engaged in deconstructing their firms’ value chains and seeking
to maximize efficiency and effectiveness through supplier networks
and through judicious use of foreign locations that they can gain from
accessing comparative advantage in location choice and from considering outsourcing non-critical activities. But they already know those
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